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If California were to seriously 
commit to equalizing opportunity 
and reducing poverty, how might that 
commitment best be realized? 
This is of course a hypothetical question, as there is no 
evidence that California is poised to make such a serious com-
mitment, nor have many other states gone much beyond the 
usual lip-service proclamations. There are many reasons for Cal-
ifornia’s complacency, but an important one is that most people 
think that poverty is intractable and that viable solutions to it 
simply don’t exist.
When Californians know what needs to be done, they tend 
to go forward and get it done. When, for example, the state’s 
roads are in disrepair, there are rarely paralyzing debates about 
exactly how to go about fixing them; instead we proceed with the 
needed repairs as soon as the funds to do so are appropriated. 
The same type of sure and certain prescription might appear to 
be unavailable when it comes to reducing poverty. It is hard not 
to be overwhelmed by the cacophony of voices yielding a thick 
stream of narrow-gauge interventions, new evaluations, and 
piecemeal proposals.1 
Although the research literature on poverty is indeed large 
and may seem confusing, recent advances have in fact been so 
fundamental that it is now possible to develop a science-based 
response to poverty. In the past, the causes of poverty were not 
well understood, and major interventions, such as the War on 
Poverty, had to be built more on hunch than science. It is an 
altogether different matter now. The causes of poverty are well 
established, and the effects of many possible policy responses 
to poverty are likewise well established. The simple purpose of 
this essay is to assemble these advances into a coherent plan 
that would, if implemented, reduce poverty in California sub-
stantially. 
A High-Poverty State 
In any discussion of poverty in California, perhaps the most 
important point to be made is that we have much of it, indeed 
likely more than in any other state in the United States.2 The 
California Poverty Measure (CPM), a measure that improves on 
the Census Bureau’s supplemental poverty measure, indicates 
that 22.0 percent of all Californians are living in poverty.3 This 
poverty is often very extreme. In fact, 6.1 percent of California’s 
population lives in “deep poverty,” meaning that their family 
income is less than 50 percent of the poverty threshold.4 
Does it follow that California’s current poverty policy, under-
stood narrowly as the many programs making up the safety net, 
has failed us? Not at all. The “mechanical” effects of state and 
federal benefits in pushing family income above the poverty 
threshold are in fact quite large. If all safety-net benefits were 
suddenly eliminated (CalFresh, CalWORKs, tax credits, school 
meals, housing subsidies, SSI, Social Security), the percentage 
of California’s population in poverty would increase by a full 
12.9 points (from 22.0 percent to 34.9 percent).5 This result 
makes it clear that, despite the many criticisms leveled against 
the safety net, it is doing real and substantial poverty-reducing 
work in its current form. To be sure, the state’s poverty popu-
lation remains the largest in the country even after our state’s 
safety net is applied, but that should not obscure the equally 
important point that, absent the safety net, the poverty popula-
tion would be far larger. 
The Role of Evidence and Values in Poverty Policy 
What, then, might be done to reduce California’s unusually high 
poverty rate? We have no interest in issuing an academic report 
about policies that will never be undertaken. We have much 
interest, by contrast, in laying out policies and programs that 
would reduce poverty substantially and garner public support. 
In the plan presented here, we have accordingly taken very seri-
ously the key values and commitments that are widely shared 
within the United States, values and commitments that affect 
the types of programs that we are likely to embrace and call our 
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own. There is little point, for example, in attempting to incor-
porate programs or policies that rest on a wholly foreign set of 
values, even if those programs or policies are proven poverty-
reducers. It is not simply that such programs would likely be 
opposed by many Californians and therefore never come to 
fruition. Even if they were somehow implemented, the resulting 
policies would never feel like our own, would not mesh well with 
our existing institutions, and would likely be mired in contro-
versy from the start. 
This line of reasoning suggests a set of reforms that express 
our shared commitment to the principles of equal opportunity 
and the value of work. Although the United States is a hetero-
geneous country with many competing commitments, there 
is much evidence indicating that these two commitments are 
widely accepted and would accordingly serve well as the founda-
tion for safety-net reform.6 We review each in turn below. 
Equal opportunity: However difficult to achieve, the principle 
of equal opportunity has long figured prominently in American 
discourse, indeed it is even laid out in drafts of the country’s 
founding documents. This principle implies that all children, 
those from rich and poor families alike, should have a meaning-
ful opportunity to develop their talents and capacities. The equal 
opportunity plan, which we lay out below, accordingly comprises 
a comprehensive sequence of interventions that level the playing 
field by allowing poor children the same access to opportunities 
(e.g., opportunities for high-quality preschool) that are readily 
available to their better-off counterparts. 
Making work pay: If the commitment to equal opportunity is 
deeply cherished, so too is the principle that everyone should 
work (insofar as they are able to do so) and that hard work 
should pay off. In 1996, the U.S. welfare system was revamped 
to encourage employment and reduce welfare dependency, a 
reform that was followed by a substantial decline in the size of 
the nonworking poor population.7 If a new round of safety-net 
reforms is consonant with this commitment to work and mak-
ing work pay, it will again express our deepest values and garner 
widespread support. We will propose below a set of legal and tax 
reforms that may be understood as a particular rendition of this 
commitment.
There is of course a wide range of interventions on offer 
within the context of these two constraints. At the behest of 
GRACE Inc., a comprehensive review of these interventions 
was recently undertaken, with the objective to identify those for 
which the evidence was unusually clear and compelling.8 For 
the most part, the resulting proposals entail building on Cali-
fornia’s existing safety net, in effect ramping up those programs 
for which the evidence is strong. That is, rather than assembling 
some haphazard collection of programs that have been shown 
to work, our objective is to choose from among such successful 
programs only those that integrate well with California’s existing 
programs. We have also sought to build on and exploit various 
reforms under way in California (e.g., health care reform, Local 
Control Funding Formula).9 The goal, in short, is to build a com-
prehensive reform package that rests on programs backed by the 
best science, that integrates seamlessly with the existing safety 
net, and that builds on initiatives already in play.
This essay presents in summary form the package of reforms 
that emerged out of this review and that, taken together, offer an 
unprecedented opportunity to reduce poverty in California now 
and into the future. The package is motivated by a commitment 
to equalize access to investments in skills and to ensure that 
those who work hard will not be in poverty.
Reducing Poverty by Equalizing Opportunity
The literature on poverty reveals a growing consensus that cost-
effective policy should (a) identify the key junctures in the life 
course that determine the development of skills and capacities 
and (b) intervene at those junctures in ways that offset the dis-
advantages facing low-income children. The resulting reforms 
are founded on a commitment to ensure that opportunities 
to develop capacities and invest in skills (“human capital”) 
are available to all children. It is of course difficult to equalize 
opportunities fully and completely because children born into 
middle-class families will inevitably have access to better health 
care, better child care, better schools, and all manner of other 
advantages that will ultimately assist them in the labor market. 
The cumulative effect of such advantages can nonetheless be 
reduced with compensatory programs targeted to key junctures 
when capacities are being formed or decisions are being made. 
Although this approach naturally leads one to early interven-
tions, there are also critical junctures in the later life course that 
are cost-effective to target.10 
We briefly review this approach by laying out cost-effective 
interventions at each successive stage of the life course. We start 
with home visiting programs that intervene very early in the life 
course (even prenatally); we then turn to early education for pre-
school children; we follow with a targeted set of interventions for 
school-age children and young adults; and we conclude by dis-
cussing a set of legal and tax reforms that reduce discrimination 
and (partly) compensate for barriers to opportunity confronted 
early in life. 
Home Visiting Programs
We begin, then, by discussing home visiting programs oriented 
toward improving child and adult health practices, improving 
parenting, and providing referrals to available social services. 
These programs are built around home visits by nurses or trained 
staff who provide at-risk mothers with guidance on (a) diet and 
other prenatal practices, (b) the child’s health and development, 
and (c) parenting. The main rationale for such programs is that 
they identify at-risk children early on, intervene before problems 
cascade into much larger ones, and thereby lead to improved 
health, parenting, and cognitive development in ways that have 
substantial long-term benefits. 
These programs emerge from the growing evidence that pre-
natal and early childhood experiences affect neural functions 
and structures that in turn shape future cognitive, social, emo-
tional, and health outcomes.11  Even at 18 months old, children 
from poorer households are much slower at identifying pictures 
of simple words, such as “dog” or “ball.”12 By kindergarten, there 
is a substantial gap between poor and middle-class children in 
reading skills (e.g., recognizing letters), math skills (e.g., count-
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ing), and behavioral regulation.13 Because the effects of poverty 
register so early in children, and because these effects then have 
long-lasting consequences, there is a compelling argument to 
intervene early in ways that will reduce these consequences. The 
home visiting approach rests on precisely this argument. 
The case for home visiting programs is backed by a large body 
of randomized controlled trials and other high-quality research 
that demonstrates their effectiveness.14 The U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services has designated a number of 
home visiting models as evidence-based, but we focus here on 
research evaluating the Nurse-Family Partnership (NFP) and 
Healthy Families America (HFA), as these two programs have 
already been adopted by the California Home Visiting Program.
The health benefits of NFP and HFA are clear. Although the 
specifics of the results differ across NFP and HFA, the general 
pattern is one of reduced child abuse, increased home safety, 
reduced emergency medical care, and improved developmental 
outcomes.15 The research evidence on cognitive development 
and school readiness is also strong. The children participating 
in home visiting programs are more attentive, regulate their 
behavior better, and develop better language skills. In a well-
known randomized controlled trial, 6-year-olds enrolled in an 
NFP program “demonstrated higher intellectual functioning 
and receptive vocabulary scores…and had fewer behavioral 
problems,” when compared with children treated with minimal 
support services.16 
The home visiting landscape in California is complicated, 
however, by virtue of a large number of overlapping providers, 
funding sources, and target populations. The current tapestry of 
programs is a patchwork affair that misses some at-risk families 
and is often focused on narrowly delineated health problems 
rather than the larger family situation. The home visiting pro-
gram might accordingly be reformed by expanding coverage and 
providing a broader range of family services (e.g., linking fami-
lies to social services).17 Although an exact estimate of unmet 
need is unavailable, the best data suggest that approximately 
465,000 California families with children up to age 5 are in 
CPM poverty, have young children, and are not currently being 
served by the California Home Visiting Program or the Early 
Start Program.18 
The skeptic might worry that home visiting programs 
address symptoms rather than causes and therefore do not cut 
to the heart of California’s poverty problem. In evaluating this 
claim, it is useful to distinguish between (a) the poverty aris-
ing from problems with labor supply (e.g., underinvestment 
in human capital) and (b) the poverty arising from problems 
on the demand side (e.g., shortage of jobs, excess of low-wage 
jobs). The home visiting program of course addresses the supply 
side of the problem. That is, insofar as poverty in its unchecked 
form leads to various health, cognitive, and other developmen-
tal problems, a home visiting program has protective effects 
that can ultimately improve the capacity of at-risk children to 
make human capital investments (e.g., investments in a col-
lege education). If there are enough high-quality training slots 
to accommodate this new capacity for investment (e.g., enough 
college scholarships), then home visiting programs will work 
to reduce the number of low-skill workers and increase the 
number of high-skill workers. The poverty rate will accordingly 
be reduced, not just because the children from home visiting 
programs are more likely to develop the skills that bring about 
higher wages, but also because there will be fewer low-skill 
workers and hence less in the way of wage-reducing competi-
tion among them. It follows that a home visiting program can be 
understood as a systemic response to California’s poverty. 
We are of course assuming here that a ramped-up home visit-
ing program is ultimately paired with a ramped-up commitment 
to providing the education (e.g., vocational training, college) 
that the new demand for human capital investment will make 
necessary. Put differently, a successful home visiting program 
will create a new bulge at the bottom of the training pipeline, 
a bulge that some 15 years later will need to be met by increas-
ing opportunities at the top of that pipeline (e.g., high-quality 
college slots, high-quality vocational training slots). The more 
proximate need, of course, will be to develop the new capacities 
that will emerge in the middle of this pipeline. If an expanded 
home visiting program yields the expected health and cognitive 
gains for very young children, the logical follow-up is to cultivate 
those gains by increasing opportunities to participate in early 
childhood education. We therefore turn next to a discussion of 
early childhood education programs and how they might indeed 
be “ramped up.”
Early Childhood Education
The home visiting program arguably takes the early-intervention 
approach to its logical limit by intervening prenatally (and then 
continuing services up to age 5). Although early childhood edu-
cation (ECE) programs of course start after birth, they are still 
chiefly understood as a classic early intervention approach. The 
empirical rationale for these programs is much the same as that 
for home visiting: The available evidence suggests that key cog-
nitive and behavioral inequalities are typically established before 
children begin formal schooling and sometimes do not increase 
all that much thereafter. The income gap in achievement tests, 
for example, is already very large when children enter kinder-
garten and remains much the same size as children progress 
through elementary school.19 The purpose of ECE is to take up 
where home visiting programs left off by providing the early 
experiences, stimulation, and training that can prevent such a 
large gap from emerging before children enter kindergarten. 
The evidence on behalf of ECE is strong, but not without 
some complexities. In discussing this literature, the standard 
and natural starting place is the now-famous evidence on two 
intensive and small-scale programs, the Perry Preschool and 
Abecedarian programs.20 The Perry Preschool study was based 
on an experiment with random assignment of low-income 
African-American children to either the experimental condition 
(attending the Perry Preschool) or a control group that entered 
kindergarten at age 5. In the experimental condition, children 
attended preschool from ages 3 to 5, with classes meeting 2.5 
hours per day for five days per week. The program included 
weekly home visits with the children and their parents (and in 
this regard may be understood as an amalgam of home visit-
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ing and conventional preschool programs). The key result: 
The members of the treatment group increased their cognitive 
and noncognitive skills as well as earnings, were less likely to 
be arrested, and were less dependent on social programs. The 
Abecedarian program, which was similar in treatment intensity, 
yielded roughly comparable results. 
Are such positive results found only in small-scale programs? 
Absolutely not. The best-known study of a public preschool pro-
gram, the Chicago Child-Parent Centers, showed effects similar 
in size to those of the Perry and Abecedarian programs.21 There 
have likewise been very promising results in the Boston Public 
School Pre-K Program.22 The average effect across all programs is 
sizable: In a recent meta-analysis of 123 quasi-experimental and 
experimental studies of ECE programs, the long-term effects on 
cognitive outcomes (e.g., test scores), school progress (e.g., high 
school graduation), and socio-emotional development were all 
found to be quite large.23 
The case for expanding California’s ECE program rests on 
these very positive results.24 The two key problems with Cali-
fornia’s existing ECE program are that (a) there aren’t enough 
slots in California for low-income children,25 and (b) the available 
slots are not all of adequate quality. If one were to craft an ECE 
reform, it should accordingly address both deficiencies at once by 
increasing the number of ECE slots and improving the quality of 
ECE slots. These reforms, if undertaken, would equalize oppor-
tunities by allowing low-income children to develop their skills 
and capacities in ways that would ultimately position them to opt 
for high-quality vocational training, attend college, or otherwise 
increase their human capital. 
Late Interventions
We have to this point presented the home visiting and early 
childhood education programs as high-return exemplars of the 
early-intervention approach. Although the evidence behind them 
is compelling, there is also strong evidence on behalf of some 
later interventions, evidence to which we will now turn. The 
life course is studded with a series of critical junctures, some of 
which occur very early in life (e.g., early brain development), but 
others of which occur later on (e.g., college entry).26 If we do not 
address these later critical junctures, as well as the early ones, 
we will not fully exploit the increased capacity for human capital 
investments secured by improving early childhood experiences. 
The task before us, therefore, is to identify the late childhood 
junctures at which children are blocked from acquiring human 
capital. 
There are many programs and institutions designed to assist 
the state’s low-income children as they negotiate primary and 
secondary school, including (a) Title I programs that improve 
opportunities for academic success in low-income schools, (b) 
dedicated extracurricular and summer-school activities for low-
income children, (c) programs for disseminating information 
about preparing for and applying to college, and (d) financial aid 
and loans for low-income children attending college or vocational 
schools. The relevant evidence suggests that many of these pro-
grams for children in primary and secondary school are effective 
and should be expanded. We will not attempt to weigh in on these 
programs here. As the Local Control Funding Formula (LCFF) is 
implemented in California, children from disadvantaged fami-
lies may have increased access to many of these programs, thus 
equalizing opportunities within the later life course.
This is not to suggest that California should rely exclusively on 
the changes that the LCFF should bring about. The State would 
do well to additionally exploit a newer class of interventions that, 
by building on existing programs, offer further opportunities for 
substantial returns at very low cost. The simple insight behind 
these interventions is that many key investments (e.g., going to 
college) require students to overcome entrenched impediments to 
good decision making and follow-through.27 These impediments 
can be overcome with informational and social-psychological 
interventions that have been rigorously tested and can now be 
incorporated into California’s existing programming at low cost:
A social-psychological intervention: A series of brief training 
exercises can reverse debilitating beliefs about capacities and 
lead to sizable and long-lasting gains in academic achieve-
ment.28
Informational support: By providing better information and 
waiving application fees, low-income students with a record 
of superior achievement will apply to and attend colleges that 
are well matched to their capacities and talents.29 
A text-messaging intervention: A low-cost program of person-
alized (but automated) text messages can increase college 
attendance among low-income students.30 
Although our natural instinct is to assume that big problems 
require big institutional reforms, this class of interventions 
instead proceeds from the recognition that big problems are 
sometimes amenable to highly targeted and narrow-gauge solu-
tions. 
The payoff to the foregoing interventions (per dollar invested) 
is likely as large as the payoff to high-quality early childhood edu-
cation.31 To be sure, there is no disputing that early childhood 
education yields a higher payoff than many late interventions 
(e.g., conventional job training programs), but it does not follow 
that it yields a higher payoff than all of them.32 It also bears noting 
that, while the late interventions mentioned here have compel-
ling evidence behind them, a host of others also hold promise 
and might be developed into a fuller suite of late interventions.33 
We have to this point discussed (a) the effects of the LCFF 
in equalizing school funding, and (b) some additional late inter-
ventions that may be usefully layered on top of LCFF-induced 
changes. These two classes of reforms work in the main to pro-
vide higher-quality schooling to disadvantaged children and 
thereby equalize access to college. It is of course also important to 
develop a third class of late interventions that equalize access to 
jobs that do not require a college education. Although job training 
programs are sometimes represented as the prototypic low-return 
investment, the latest evidence suggests that these programs can 
have high payoff when training is targeted to expanding sectors 
of the economy. Because community colleges have become the 
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center of contemporary workforce development, a shift to such 
“sectoral programs” may be best promoted by developing new 
funding formulas that incentivize community colleges to carry 
out training in high-demand fields.34
Making Work Pay
The foregoing reforms, which focus on upgrading the skills 
and capacities of California’s labor force, might be criticized 
for ignoring the role of low-paying jobs in generating poverty. 
After all, if the main problem is that jobs just don’t pay enough, 
shouldn’t we take the bull by the horns and find a way to increase 
pay directly? 
This claim is misleading insofar as it implies that the pay 
attached to jobs can be affected only by directly legislating it. We 
can also affect pay indirectly by changing the relative supply of 
low-skill and high-skill labor. If a labor-supply approach were 
implemented and allowed children from low-income families 
to better develop their capacities and skills, a growing number 
of workers would exit the low-skill sector, thus increasing their 
own wages as well as tamping down wage-lowering competi-
tion among those still in that sector. As the low-skill sector thins 
out, employers will have to pay more for the remaining laborers, 
which will induce them to refocus on the “high road” of auto-
mation and allow California to move more fully into a high-skill 
niche.
This line of reasoning makes it clear that wages in the low-
skill sector are unduly low because the sector is flooded with 
workers who have not had a full and open opportunity to secure 
higher skills. The approaches discussed in the prior sections 
are intended to equalize such opportunities: We need to expand 
home visiting programs because we want all children, no mat-
ter how rich or poor their parents, to be raised in environments 
that protect their health and develop their capacities; we need to 
expand early childhood education because we want all children, 
no matter how rich or poor their parents, to be raised in envi-
ronments in which those capacities are cultivated and have an 
opportunity to flourish; and we turn to late childhood interven-
tions because we want all children, no matter how rich or poor 
their parents, to have full and complete access to college or other 
training opportunities. It will of course take more time than we 
would like for these opportunity-equalizing programs to bear 
fruit. If tax credits are applied now, we can immediately raise the 
pay of low-skill workers and thereby compensate, if only partially, 
for the reduced opportunities that most of them faced earlier in 
their lives. Although the need for such wage support will lessen 
as soon as opportunities are equalized, there is a pressing need 
to prop up wages now given that the low-skill sector is flooded 
with workers who did not have many opportunities.
The two most obvious approaches to “making work pay” entail 
directly supplementing the income of low-wage workers via the 
minimum wage or the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Because 
there are ongoing efforts to further raise California’s minimum 
wage, and because these efforts, even if wildly successful, will not 
reduce poverty by nearly the necessary amount, our comments 
below will focus on the possibility of a parallel effort to increase 
the EITC.35 To date, 26 states have their own state-funded EITCs, 
usually taking the simple form of a fixed percentage of the fed-
eral credit. If the federal EITC were supplemented by 10 percent, 
California would be a “middle-of-the-pack” state (relative to other 
states currently providing supplementation). Although a good 
case could be made for a yet more substantial supplement, the 
modest one recommended here rests on the likelihood that the 
federal EITC will be increased in the near future. 
This recommendation is grounded in the now-overwhelming 
evidence that the EITC increases employment and earnings.36 
When the EITC has been expanded, the increases in employment 
among families with children are quite substantial, especially 
among those with female family heads.37 The downstream ben-
efits of the EITC are likewise impressive: The EITC improves 
the mental and physical health of mothers, reduces the likeli-
hood of low birth weights, improves performance on cognitive 
tests, and increases college enrollment.38 The extra money that 
the EITC delivers to parents makes it into a supply-side inter-
vention as well. When parental income is increased, children 
are raised in healthier and less stressful circumstances, which 
in turn positions them to make more substantial human capital 
investments. This is why Hilary Hoynes recently concluded that 
the EITC may “ultimately be judged one of the most successful 
labor market innovations in U.S. history.”39
Does it follow that an expanded EITC could fully solve 
California’s poverty problem? This seems unlikely. If an EITC 
supplement were adopted in California, many families in deep 
poverty would simply not benefit from it. From its inception, the 
EITC has been intended to incentivize work, which means that 
families without any employed workers will not directly benefit 
from it. The ongoing rise of nonworking poverty would therefore 
go unaddressed by an EITC-based reform.40 It follows that, inso-
far as a state EITC were adopted, it should be coupled with other 
reforms (e.g., increased CalWORKs funding) that assist those in 
even more profound need.
This part of the equal opportunity plan, unlike the two fore-
going parts (i.e., home visiting, early childhood education), thus 
relies on cash transfers or tax credits.  Are such transfers or cred-
its difficult to reconcile with core U.S. values?  Absolutely not. 
The EITC is consistent with the country’s values not just because 
it ensures that “work pays” but also because it compensates for 
the reduced opportunities that most recipients faced earlier in 
their lives.  This is not, however, the only way in which income 
transfers are opportunity-equalizing interventions. The EITC 
and CalWORKs also equalize opportunities for the next genera-
tion: That is, by raising the income of poor families, the EITC 
and CalWORKs act to level the playing field for the children 
raised in these families. There is growing evidence that, when 
income is transferred to poor families, the children in these 
families ultimately grow up healthier, have higher earnings, and 
work longer hours.41
It also bears noting that any meaningful commitment to 
equal opportunity should go beyond such transfers and cred-
its by addressing the legal and institutional sources of poverty. 
The careful reader will note that—to this point—our discus-
sion has followed convention by conflating anti-poverty policy 
with safety net policy. This conflation, however conventional, is 
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deeply problematic. After all, wages and unemployment are also 
directly affected by a host of legal and institutional practices that 
are quite unrelated to the safety net itself, practices that lead to 
(a) an especially high risk of incarceration for children born into 
poverty (notably African Americans), and (b) employment dis-
crimination against mothers, members of some racial groups, 
undocumented immigrants, and the formerly incarcerated. 
These various forms of discrimination, each of which is inconsis-
tent with a commitment to equal opportunity, can be addressed 
through legal reform and improved enforcement (some of which 
can be implemented at the state level).  
Although we have focused much of our commentary on safety 
net reform, this legal and institutional reform cuts to the heart 
of any commitment to equal opportunity and must accordingly 
be understood as central to any meaningful equal opportunity 
plan.  The available evidence, which suggests such reform would 
dramatically raise employment and wages in high-poverty popu-
lations, speaks to the power of policies that address causes (e.g., 
discrimination) rather than symptoms (e.g., low pay, unemploy-
ment).42
Conclusions
We started this essay by noting that California’s poverty rate, 
which now stands at 22.0 percent, is higher than that of any 
other state. Worse yet, the poverty rate for high-school dropouts 
is a shocking 53.9 percent, a rate over five times higher than that 
for college graduates. The safety net has of course stepped up to 
the challenge by substantially reducing poverty relative to what 
would have prevailed in its absence. That said, even after the 
safety net has done all its important work, we are left with more 
than one in five Californians in poverty and the highest poverty 
rate in the country.
Why hasn’t this dismal state of affairs led to concerted action 
and the development of a new antipoverty plan? There are, to 
be sure, many reasons why poverty hasn’t been taken on, but 
an especially important one is that we haven’t known how to do 
so in a way that’s both backed by science and consistent with 
our beliefs about how a safety net should work. The state has 
therefore adopted a business-as-usual stance in which safety-net 
funding plods along, the poverty research industry plods along, 
and there is but a vague and distant hope that a magic-bullet 
solution will ultimately present itself. 
We do not need to wait any longer. The main purpose of our 
essay has been to describe just how far the relevant science has 
come and to craft an antipoverty program rooted in that science. 
Although we do not mean to suggest that the evidence on all 
issues is clear-cut, there is a growing consensus around a two-
pronged approach that combines opportunity-equalizing and 
wage-raising reforms.43 
This approach is well-tested, yields returns in excess of the 
investments, is consistent with our beliefs about how safety nets 
should work, integrates well with existing programs in Califor-
nia, and can be delivered with a centralized or decentralized (e.g., 
Promise Neighborhood) approach. The resulting program is not 
about treating symptoms, not about providing short-term relief, 
and certainly not about charity. It is about building a training 
system, labor market, and economy that provide opportunities 
for everyone and that ensure decent rewards for hard work. 
Because the proposed supply-side and tax-credit reforms treat 
the upstream causes of poverty, they will bring about a perma-
nent reduction in the size of the poverty population and reduce 
future demands on the safety net. The poverty population will 
permanently shrink because low-income children will have new 
opportunities to develop capacities and make high-payoff invest-
ments in skills. By virtue of these opportunities, children from 
low-income families will no longer be mired in the low-wage 
sector, which not only raises their own wages but also reduces 
wage-lowering competition among the shrinking number of 
workers who do remain in that sector. 
The evidence behind this program is strong, but it is not just 
evidence alone that recommends it. It is also attractive because, 
unlike some safety-net programs and interventions, it comports 
well with the country’s long-standing commitment to equal-
izing opportunity and ensuring that hard work pays off. We 
too often embrace the latest flavor-of-the-day programs simply 
because they work and happen to have supporters. This is surely 
understandable: After all, only rarely does any poverty-reducing 
program have much support, so we’re loath to be all that prin-
cipled when one finally does. The great virtue, however, of a 
more principled approach is that it lays out our commitments 
clearly and allows us to build our institutions in defense of them. 
The equal opportunity plan reminds us that we’re committed to 
opportunity for all children and that we’ll intervene aggressively 
whenever that commitment is circumvented. When our safety 
net tells a simple story in this way, it becomes a cherished institu-
tion that we hold near and dear, an institution that makes sense 
to us and that we’re especially willing to defend. n
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